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Abstract
States producing gas and oil have long levied severance taxes at the point of extraction, commonly
placing most revenues into general funds. These taxes have assumed new meaning in many states amid
the expansion of gas and oil production accompanying the advent of hydraulic fracturing. We reviewed
all major statutes and constitutional amendments related to severance taxes that were enacted at the state
level during the first decade of the “shale era” (2005–14). There have been only modest adjustments in
statutory tax rates and some evidence that states have attempted to reduce these rates, possibly in response
to growing national production. In turn, there is also evidence that states have begun to pursue more
targeted strategies for revenue use, including some expanded focus on responding to the negative
externalities linked to drilling, expanded revenue sharing with localities, and increased long-term
protection of resources through state trust funds.
KEY WORDS: energy, environment, governance, economic development, fracking, hydraulic fractur-
ing, shale gas, severance, taxation, severance tax, states, United States
Introduction
Two distinct options for taxing energy from fossil fuels have dominated scholarly
and media analysis in the American federal system in recent decades. Perhaps the
most familiar option involves excise taxes on gasoline or diesel fuel. Such a tax is
operational in every state and matched by a federal counterpart that, when com-
bined, are intended to cover much of the cost of maintaining and expanding Amer-
ican highways. This tax has proven highly sensitive to proposed increases in recent
decades, producing considerable controversy amid revenue shortfall as vehicular
fuel economy has increased and overall mileage has declined. In turn, direct taxa-
tion or related pricing of the carbon content of fossil fuels via cap-and-trade have
dominated state and federal debate over policy development to mitigate green-
house gas emissions for more than a decade. This is widely thought to be the most
cost-effective approach to climate mitigation, backed by a diverse range of econo-
mists and policy analysts. Yet neither a single state nor the federal government has
ever adopted a carbon tax and two or the three regional carbon cap-and-trade pro-
grams operational in 2010 have either fully or partially collapsed.
Thus, energy taxation is generally perceived as extremely difficult politically in
the American federal system, reflecting considerable sensitivity to direct cost
imposition on highly visible energy sources such as gasoline, diesel, oil, and natu-
ral gas (Rabe & Borick, 2012). States and the federal government have increas-
ingly turned to general revenues to cover transportation system costs. Both have
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turned to a range of regulatory provisions rather than any form of carbon pric-
ing to address greenhouse gases. Nonetheless, there is at least one form of
energy taxation operational in approximately 35 American states that appear to
have a much broader and more durable base of political support. Many of these
taxes were established generations ago and yet are now beginning to produce
new revenues as shale gas and oil production has grown rapidly in the United
States. Two states have added entirely new taxes of this sort during the past three
years and dozens of states have either passed amending legislation or constitu-
tional amendments to determine such issues as tax rates and revenue use during
the past decade (see Table 1). One state has refused to adopt this type of tax,
instead enacting a fee, although this decision remains highly controversial and
was a central 2014 gubernatorial campaign issue.
Indeed, the evolving world of state severance taxes on gas and oil has become a
dominant consideration in many state capitals during that same period. Severance
taxes impose a cost on the extraction of natural resources as they are being severed
from beneath the surface of the earth. States have long applied severance taxes to
mining for coal, iron ore, and other minerals, but early in the twentieth century
states with significant deposits of oil or natural gas also began to develop such taxes,
most commonly taking a set percentage of the gross value of the resource. Texas,
for example, established a 4.6% rate on oil in 1907 and followed with a 7.5% rate
on natural gas in 1931; neither statutory rate has ever changed despite dramatic
expansion of production and price per unit of energy, although a series of tax
incentives were developed in the 1990s to encourage expanded drilling (Mieszkowski
& Soligo, 2012, p. 333). Other states have made significant adjustments in these taxes
over time, with common points of variation between states including rates and
incentives to expand drilling, differential treatment of oil and gas, measures such as
volume rather than value in applying tax rates, and revenue utilization.
These state taxes largely disappeared from scholarly and media attention until
recent years, when the development of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling
(or so-called “fracking”) techniques made possible dramatic expansion in natural gas
and oil yields. Instead of phasing out oil and gas development under anticipated
“peak oil,” established production states such as Oklahoma and Texas registered
major output increases. With the emergence of fracking, states with more limited
drilling history such as North Dakota, Mississippi, and Illinois began to prepare for
the prospect of expansion far beyond anything ever envisioned within their bounda-
ries. As a result, severance taxes have begun to receive intensive political scrutiny in
many state capitals, as states consider what to do with massive revenue bounties that
account for significant portions of state tax revenue (see Table 2) and how to posi-
tion themselves as emerging petro-states amid growing interstate competition.
Any federal government role in this area remains quite limited, largely con-
fined to oversight of drilling on federal lands given a series of exemptions for oil
and gas in many potentially applicable federal statutes (Warner & Shapiro, 2013).
As a result, states have enormous latitude to design their own regulatory systems
and consider what sorts of taxes and related fees, if any, that they would want to
collect. Evidence of this action is found in the fact that 14 states enacted 27 pieces
of significant new legislation or amendments on severance taxes in the first dec-
ade of the so-called “shale era” (2005–14), determined through a database
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created from the legislative archives of the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures (See Table 1). Still, severance taxes are but one snapshot of oil and gas-
related funding available to state legislatures. Property taxes and state leases, as
Table 1. State Severance Tax Legislation Reviewed, 2005–14
State Year Legislation Description
Alaska 2013 SB 21 Changes tax rate to 35% of the production value of oil and gas,
but also adds new incentives and deductions to lower the
effective tax rate.
Alaska 2007 HB 2001 Increases tax rate to 25%. Known as Alaska’s Clear and Equita-
ble Share (ACES).
Alaska 2006 HB 3001 Establishes tax rate at 20% of net profits. Known as Petroleum
Profits Tax (PPT).
Arkansas 2006 SB 1 Increases natural gas severance tax rate from $0.003 per MCF
to 5% of sales price and puts a three-year rate of 1.5% for
“high-cost wells.”
Colorado 2014 SB 14-154 Allocates severance tax operational fund revenue to the wildfire
preparedness fund.
Colorado 2014 HB 14-1333 Transfers severance tax perpetual base fund to water conserva-
tion board construction fund.
Colorado 2013 HB 13-1057 Allocates severance tax trust fund revenue to geological survey
and avalanche information center.
Colorado 2012 HB 12-1315 Allocates revenues to innovative energy fund and local govern-
ment severance tax fund.
Colorado 2012 SB 12S-002 Transfers revenue to the Colorado water conservation board
for reservoir projects.
Colorado 2010 HB 10-1250 Allocates perpetual base account revenue to Colorado water
conservation board construction fund for Animas-LA Plata
Project Water.
Colorado 2009 SB 09-165 Allocates perpetual base account to small communities water
and wastewater grant fund.
Colorado 2009 HB 09-1199 Transfers revenue to healthy forests and vibrant communities
fund and wildland-urban interface training fund.
Idaho 2012 HB 379 Amends and combines two severance taxes, changing tax rate
to 2.5% of market value of oil and gas.
Illinois 2013 SB 1715 Known as the Illinois Hydraulic Fracturing Tax Act: establishes
Illinois severance tax.
Louisiana 2009 HB 765 Allocates portion of revenues to the Atchafalaya Basin conser-
vation fund.
Mississippi 2013 HB 1698 Adds tax rate of 1.3% of value of oil and gas produced from
horizontally drilled wells.
North Carolina 2014 SB 786 Known as the Energy Modernization Act: establishes North
Carolina severance tax.
North Dakota 2013 HB 1278 Allocates portion of production tax revenues to newly created
outdoor heritage fund.
North Dakota 2013 HB 1358 Alters revenue allocation to counties and hub cities.
North Dakota 2013 SB 2014 Allocates oil extraction development funds to newly created
energy conservation grant fund.
North Dakota 2010 HCR 3054 and
Ballot Measure 1
Creates the Legacy Fund and allocates 30% of oil and gas reve-
nues to the Legacy Fund.
Oklahoma 2014 HB 2562 Changes rate of Oklahoma’s gross production tax on oil and
natural gas.
Pennsylvania 2012 Act 13 Creates Pennsylvania impact fee on oil or gas wells produced
within the state.
Texas 2014 Ballot Measure,
Proposition 1
Reallocates oil and gas tax revenues from the Rainy Day Fund
into transportation funding.
Utah 2012 Ballot Measure,
Amendment A
Requires specific allocation formula of severance tax revenues
to the Permanent State Trust Fund.
Utah 2008 Ballot Measure,
Amendment B
Permits legislature to direct money or other assets given to the
Permanent State Trust Fund Under any provision under
law.
West Virginia 2014 SB 461 Creates West Virginia Future Fund and allocates 3% of the sev-
erance tax revenue to fund.
Note: All official documents on file at the Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy.
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well as state income taxes, local government leases, and federal government
leases, also play a significant role in oil and gas revenue generation. This article,
however, will examine key lessons on state strategy related to severance taxes
specifically and, more broadly, what these lessons tell us about state approaches
to shale governance (Rabe, 2014). Of particular focus will also be the relationship
of states with their localities (Davis, 2014). Recent shifts in revenue allocation
raise significant questions, including whether revenues are shared with local gov-
ernments that host drilling to assist them in addressing environmental and social
issues that emerge from production activity.
This article will review the pattern of the development of severance taxes in
the shale era. It will begin with further discussion of the political history and
economy in which these taxes were originally established. This will be followed
by a discussion of severance taxes that places them into the emerging context of
the most recent decade: a shale era that expands the total supply of energy, the
number of potential competing state suppliers, and the more decentralized
nature of energy development given proliferation of individual drilling opera-
tions. We will review how state capitals have reacted to the shale era through
their actions regarding severance tax rates and revenue allocations. This review
Table 2. Percent Share of State Severance Tax Revenue in Total State Tax Revenue by Year, 2005–13
State 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Alabama 1.86 2.14 1.63 2.18 1.39 1.08 1.34 1.30 1.29
Alaska 49.81 51.31 66.06 79.46 77.27 74.18 76.54 82.10 78.26
Arizona 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.22
Arkansas 0.28 0.32 0.29 0.37 0.45 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.94
California 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Colorado 1.90 2.49 1.49 1.57 3.28 0.83 1.55 1.71 1.31
Idaho 0.08 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.17
Kansas 2.08 2.39 1.92 2.36 2.13 1.58 1.79 1.79 0.97
Kentucky 2.52 2.90 2.78 2.92 3.65 3.32 3.36 3.30 2.49
Louisiana 8.24 7.35 8.24 9.41 8.93 8.66 8.23 9.85 9.04
Michigan 0.29 0.38 0.34 0.46 0.23 0.25 0.34 0.27 0.28
Minnesota 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.27 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.26
Mississippi 1.22 1.50 1.26 2.00 1.75 1.45 1.67 1.67 1.41
Montana 9.66 11.63 11.41 14.13 14.53 11.84 12.08 12.43 10.68
Nebraska 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.09
Nevada 0.70 0.72 0.99 1.21 2.59 3.13 4.30 4.50 4.13
New Mexico 15.91 18.07 17.05 12.01 19.34 15.13 16.16 15.10 13.73
North Dakota 18.69 21.37 21.95 34.24 34.27 42.96 49.28 56.70 46.38
Ohio 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
Oklahoma 11.12 13.56 11.57 14.22 13.03 10.51 10.70 9.62 5.80
Oregon 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.18 17.00 0.16 0.16 0.25
Pennsylvania* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.61 0.66
Texas 7.16 8.79 6.85 9.06 5.49 4.41 6.20 7.50 8.99
Utah 1.56 1.82 1.67 1.74 1.88 1.75 1.86 1.84 1.77
Washington 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.21
West Virginia 7.14 7.40 7.07 7.12 7.87 11.45 11.39 11.70 11.31
Wyoming 46.31 29.15 36.98 36.75 43.33 33.41 42.41 37.97 39.70
Sources: National Conference of State Legislatures (2012); Richardson (2005); U.S. Census Bureau, Governments
Division (2015).
Notes: Based on all severance tax revenues, not just oil and gas exclusively. Census Bureau data reflects that sever-
ance taxes are taxes on the extraction of natural resources. Severance taxes may be applied to fisheries, coal, tim-
ber, uranium, iron ore, among other resources, in addition to oil and gas. Despite these other severance taxes,
however, states that produce oil and gas receive the vast majority of severance tax collections. Bold indicates fig-
ures > 10%.
*For Pennsylvania, percent share of impact fee is listed.
392 Barry G. Rabe and Rachel L. Hampton
will link directly to the question of negative externalities produced by shale-type
development and whether revenue generated by severance taxes is being applied
to these or is instead allocated in other ways. Our findings generally suggest that
state officials have become more cautious in setting statutory rates for severance
taxes, with some pursuing rate reduction strategies in an effort to gain a competi-
tive advantage over other states. There is little empirical evidence to suggest stat-
utory rates are significant drivers behind investment decisions related to drilling
in recent years but many state legislators and governors have raised these ques-
tions in exploring possible rate reductions or opposing increases. In turn, we
find that a traditional pattern of using funds for general revenues remains preva-
lent, with some notable exceptions that appear designed to target negative exter-
nalities, increase allocations to localities, or revisit an earlier approach of
establishing trust funds that preserve at least some revenues for longer-term
investment.
The Evolution of Energy Severance Taxes in the Pre-Shale Era
In theory, many factors may compel a state to establish a severance tax, includ-
ing several directly linked to the recognition that an exhaustible and nonrenew-
able resource is being permanently withdrawn and consumed. As economist
Lowell Harriss (2006) has noted, “When used, they are used up.” A severance
tax enables a state to extract value in exchange for that permanent withdrawal.
In turn, states may look to severance taxes to cover the costs of environmental
damages and negative community impacts related to the drilling process (Tie-
tenberg, 2004). This type of action may even be driven by constitutional man-
dates that require, as in the case of Alaska, “management of the public resources
for the maximum benefit of its people” (Goldsmith, 2012, p. 55). There is con-
siderable literature in various subfields of economics that expounds on these
general principles (Costanza & Daly, 1992; Saha & Gamkhar, 2005; Tietenberg,
2004).
Alongside these theoretical considerations, states may also be eager to extract
as much revenue as possible from a nonmobile source of capital that is in high
demand domestically and internationally. For much of the last century, retrieva-
ble oil and gas deposits were concentrated in only a relatively small number of
states. As oil and gas appeared to become increasingly scarce and as international
supply disruptions continued to bid up the value of domestic supplies, major
petro-states among the American states had considerable latitude to set rates as
high as possible. “When as governor I was asked how much I would tax oil, my
response was: For every cent we can possibly get,” wrote former Alaska Republi-
can Governor Jay Hammond (2012, p. 46), who launched a process of dramatic
increases in state severance tax rates and revenues during the 1970s. When
determining appropriate rates, Hammond (2012) argued that any effort to begin
with modest rates and only consider gradual future increases was “precisely back-
ward. Instead, we should have started out with, say, a 99 percent severance tax
and worked our way slowly down until we started to get vibrations. At that point,
we would have a far better idea of what the appropriate level of taxation might
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be to encourage development that met the constitutional mandate to maximize
benefits” (p. 29).
Other states would not go as far as Alaska, but a general pattern remains that
many of the traditional oil and gas production states have retained high statutory
severance tax rates. This includes a number of states otherwise seen as averse to
most forms of taxation and intensely competitive about sustaining other tax rates
that are lower than other states and regions. In turn, severance taxes may be
particularly attractive politically when a considerable portion of the overall tax
burden can be exported ultimately to consumers outside the generating state in
the form of higher commodity costs (Mieszkowski & Soligo, 2012, p. 326; Rabe
& Borick, 2012). States such as Alaska, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming, for example, consume less than 1% of the oil and gas that they pro-
duce, and retain high statutory rates. This may parallel, to some degree,
tourism-intensive states that are inclined to set steep sales tax rates for purchases
most likely to be made by out-of-state visitors.
There has been little indication that states set their severance tax rates so as to
produce the amount of revenue needed to “effectively internalize the environ-
mental and social costs of resource extraction” (VanDeveer, 2013, p. 33). Instead,
states have overwhelmingly used these funds as a source of general revenue that
allows them to keep other taxes lower than they would be otherwise. In the case
of Wyoming, for example, there is no corporate or personal income tax because
of oil and gas revenues (Brown, 2013; Pless, 2012). In some cases, a particular
allocation has been designated, such as Arkansas’s use of 95% of its natural gas
severance tax revenues according to the Arkansas Highway Distribution Law,
with the remaining 5% to the general fund. In turn, this statute designates 75%
of oil excise tax revenues for the State Treasury Fund and the remaining 25% to
the County Aid Fund (Brown, 2013). Other states have also established modest
set-asides linked to specific environmental concerns. In Michigan, for example,
98% of state severance tax revenues are allocated to the general fund, with the
remaining 2% devoted to an orphan-well fund when its balance falls below a cer-
tain level. In the 1970s, four states (Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, and Wyom-
ing) established trust funds as a way to protect a portion of the revenues for the
longer term and guard against boom-and-bust cycles so common in resource-
based economies. This involved investment of funds into an endowment-type
structure, whereby only interest or dividends could be spent. These funds gener-
ally maintained the emphasis on general revenue expenditures but differed from
rainy-day funds in that they were designed to remain permanent legacies from
the resource extraction process.
Enter the Shale Era
This legacy of state severance taxes was established under a common under-
standing that oil and gas resources in the United States were declining, drilling
would be confined to traditional vertical operations that tended to involve a rela-
tively small number of large operations in remote locations, and any major new
deposit discoveries were highly unlikely. These assumptions have been
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challenged dramatically over the past decade, as many states began to enter into
the shale era of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling (Levi, 2013). States
have begun to address this new reality, reflected in very recent legislation and
Constitutional Amendments that consider a wide range of regulatory and public
disclosure provisions on fracking as well as issues related to severance taxation
(see Table 1). Far more states and local governments find themselves atop some
fossil-fuel deposits that might realistically be tapped than in previous energy pro-
duction eras. But the development process may involve far more drilling opera-
tions and ancillary services than under conventional drilling approaches,
particularly in parts of the country without a long history of oil and gas develop-
ment. So-called “unconventional drilling” involves considerably more wells, many
located in urban or suburban areas given greater developer mobility in search of
oil and gas.
Unconventional drilling can be quite extended and unpredictable, requiring
massive quantities of water (up to five million gallons per fracking operation)
and supplemental chemicals for each attempt to secure oil or gas. Potential nega-
tive externalities also multiply over conventional drilling, including “flowback”
wastewater contamination and disposal, seismic activity associated with increased
volumes of wastewater injection, chemical releases and spills, compressor station
noise, road damage, and transportation hazards given the vast number of truck
trips on and off each individual site (Richardson, Gottlieb, Krupnick & Wiseman,
2013). Beyond the impacts at individual sites, there is also a growing literature
on extended social, public health, and transportation risks, especially in commun-
ities that experience intensive short-term growth but uncertainty over long-term
prospects (Adgate, Goldstein, & McKenzie, 2014; Jacquet, 2014; Dutzik, Davis,
Heeke & Rumpler, 2013). As Susan Christopherson and Ned Rightor have noted,
“the risks of shale development extend outward,” beginning at each site but con-
necting to numerous other communities and states in complex ways that tran-
scend the impacts of conventional oil and gas development (Christopherson &
Rightor, 2013; Haggerty, 2012).
The arrival of the shale boom also promises potentially significant growth in
existing state severance tax revenue to address these issues or fill budget gaps.
This increased revenue would certainly be a welcome development, particu-
larly after the Great Recession took a severe toll on budgets and many states
turned to increases in excise and other specialized taxes for some fiscal relief
(Dinan & Gamkhar, 2009, p. 392). At the same time, more states became
involved in the industry than ever before and the number of impacted com-
munities likely grew exponentially. This posed many challenges for state gov-
ernments as they began to revisit shale legislation and severance taxation
programs in the late 2000s and early 2010s that seemed headed for phase-out
just a decade earlier.
There is little empirical evidence that this expansion of drilling has fueled a
race to the bottom between states in setting tax rates nor evidence that effective
tax rates markedly influence investment decisions (Spence et al., 2013). But state-
house discussions in recent years in multiple regions clearly indicate that a con-
siderable number of state legislators and governors perceive that they need to
suppress rates or expand exemptions to sustain investment. This is often fueled
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by the position of industry groups, such as the aggressive efforts by the Marcellus
Shale Coalition in three recent governorships to block creation of a Pennsylvania
severance tax with the argument that such a tax would deter drilling. In , the
Coalition pursued a multimedia campaign against a 5% tax being proposed by
Democratic gubernatorial candidate (and now Governor) Tom Wolf and
contended that a “job-crushing energy tax on shale development would harm
Pennsylvania’s economy, cost jobs and shortchange the potential benefits for the
long-term success of our state” (Spigelmyer, 2014). Then-Governor Tom Corbett
repeatedly embraced this interpretation, both on the campaign trail and in
debates with Wolf, suggesting that his opposition to a severance tax had helped
fuel the expanded development of shale gas in Pennsylvania.
Severance Tax Changes in the Shale Era: 2005–14
Shale gas and oil development began to expand in the middle of the previous
decade and many state governments started to review relevant regulatory and
taxation provisions at this time. The number of shale-related bills introduced
into state legislatures grew steadily during the decade between 2005 and 2014,
with the number of new legislative enactments climbing markedly after 2010
(Pless, 2012, 2013). In 2013, for example, 41 new statutes were enacted out of
225 bills that were introduced in 37 states, exceeding any prior year and suggest-
ing an accelerating pace of state policy development.
Severance taxation and related revenue use was one frequent topic within this
flurry of legislation, although the majority of proposed and enacted bills during
this decade-long period did not address severance taxes at all. We reviewed all
cases during this period in which severance taxes were either being created or
amended in states with established or emerging shale gas or oil development. We
discovered two cases in which new statutes established severance taxes, one case
in which a fee was enacted instead of a tax, and 35 revisions of existing taxes
through new legislation or constitutional amendments. After review of the official
text of these provisions and related government documents, we narrowed the
focus of cases slightly, excluding those that only involved minor technical
changes, such as extending an existing tax without change when it faced a
phase-out deadline in Oklahoma, limited reallocation of funds within different
accounts with the same intended goal in Kansas, or those that had no reference
to shale (such as off-shore drilling in Alabama). This brought our final sample of
cases to a total of 27 significant statutes or amendments in 14 states, as summar-
ized in Table 1. The intensified pace of severance tax policy development in very
recent years is reflected in the fact that only nine of these provisions were
approved before 2012.
We use this set of cases to explore two questions. First, we examine what states
have done with their tax rates in the shale era. As we have noted, there are con-
siderable incentives for states to set high tax rates, given the prospect of export-
ing a good deal of the costs out of state and capturing increased revenues
associated with expanding oil and gas production. At the same time, states might
respond to increasing domestic energy production and perceived
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interjurisdictional competition to keep rates low (or even reduce them) to maxi-
mize within-state development in an increasingly competitive domestic and conti-
nental market. This reflects a long-standing literature in political economy that
emphasizes subfederal willingness to reduce tax rates or add exemptions if there
is a political perception of development risk from out-of-state competition, how-
ever limited that risk may be in actual practice (Harrison, 2006; Peterson, 1995).
Statehouse debates over taxes frequently take note of these perceived risks to
development, often fueled by strong industry opposition to taxation and asser-
tions of high responsiveness to tax rates (Cocklin, 2014). Within this discussion it
is important to note that direct comparison of statutory rates can be quite mis-
leading, in part because states offer a range of complex incentives that likely
influence effective rates, though studies that have begun to control for these fac-
tors continue to find some significant cross-state variation (Independent Fiscal
Office, 2010).
Second, we review how states have used revenues from either new or revised
severance taxes in the shale era. In particular, our focus concerns whether states
were sustaining traditional patterns whereby the vast majority of funds were
blended directly into state general funds or rather, were they making adjustments
to begin to address some of the negative externalities related to shale develop-
ment? Such alterations might entail targeted expenditures for environmental pro-
tection and remediation along with direct reallocation of funds to local
jurisdictions facing pressures for expanded social, public health, and transportation
services. In turn, we asked whether there were any efforts to attempt to preserve
some of the revenue from these nonrenewable resources for longer-term consider-
ations rather than immediate expenditure? Such steps might build on the experi-
ence of trust fund development in four Western states during the 1970s, a
previous period of surging revenues from markedly expanded energy production.
Subsequent sections examine our findings concerning both of these questions.
Setting Tax Rates in the Shale Era
There is no evidence to suggest that the Alaskan model of Governor Hammond
to “soak” drilling operations with high tax rates has extended into the shale era.
The most common development in severance tax rates during the last decade
has been preserving the status quo from the pre-shale era, as only two states (Illi-
nois and North Carolina) without a tax (or a significant tax) have adopted a sev-
erance tax, while Pennsylvania has actively chosen to instead eschew a tax in
favor of a fee. Additionally, only five states with severance taxes have made signif-
icant adjustments in their statutory rates. In the latter case, Oklahoma and Mis-
sissippi have attempted to reduce statutory rates to encourage expanded drilling,
Idaho has streamlined its tax code by combining its severance taxes and updating
tax code language but made no net rate changes, and Alaska has experienced
both a major increase and subsequent decrease in its statutory rate that was sus-
tained in a 2014 ballot proposition. Arkansas increased its statutory natural gas
tax rate, but reduced its statutory rate for “high-cost” (or horizontal) wells. No
state has repealed an existing tax, although Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal
considered outright elimination in 2013 as a part of a major proposal to overhaul
Taxing Fracking 397
the state tax code. Overall, this suggests a very cautious approach to severance
tax creation and reform.
Two states did decide to establish new severance taxes or equivalents since
2012, both setting statutory rates below those of neighboring states while also
maintaining incentives that reduced effective rates. But, perhaps most signifi-
cantly, Pennsylvania, which has emerged as the nation’s second-leading producer
of natural gas (behind only Texas), did not establish a severance tax. The absence
of a Pennsylvania severance tax emerged in legislative debates in the late 2000s,
including periodic proposals for a 5% tax on gross value that would be compara-
ble to neighboring West Virginia. But the 2010 election produced executive and
legislative branch leaders who preferred to eschew any such tax in favor of an
“impact fee” that has been warmly embraced by industry (Rabe & Borick, 2013).
Under this model, the state would not establish one itself but rather collect the
revenues for any localities that opted to establish one and then share proceeds.
This fee system imposed an initial rate per well between $40,000 and $60,000
per year during its first year of operation but then declined steadily in subse-
quent years of operation, phasing out entirely after 15 years even if production
continued.
Republican Governor Tom Corbett championed this approach and secured his
party’s support within both chambers to enact this impact fee as part of a major
2012 shale legislative reform known as Act 13. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
overturned many provisions of this law in 2014, finding excessive encroachment
on local authority, but the fee system remains operational. Corbett has routinely
argued that this legislative approach, including a comparatively low impact fee as
opposed to a severance tax, has been essential in promoting expanded drilling
activity in Pennsylvania; he adamantly opposed any consideration of a severance
tax substitution for the fee despite pressures from many legislators from districts
outside the Marcellus Shale deposits. However, Corbett was decisively defeated in
his 2014 re-election bid and his successor, Tom Wolf, campaigned in large part
on a promise to revisit the severance tax issue.
Illinois was not as reluctant as Pennsylvania to refer to its cost-imposition strat-
egy for shale oil and gas as a tax, and established a new severance tax in 2013
(Rabe, 2014, p. 8374). Illinois established differential rates on gross value of oil
and gas for new shale discoveries in the southern tip of the state, with rates
remaining competitive with energy-producing neighbors such as Kentucky. In
2014, North Carolina also established a severance tax, despite there currently
being no oil and gas development in the state. The Energy Modernization Act
created this North Carolina severance tax, setting the statutory gas rate even
lower than states like West Virginia and Kentucky, at 0.9% of market value,
though above the very low rate set by an earlier tax. Additional rates are to be
phased in between 2015 and 2021, so that the statutory rate is set to increase if
the value of gas increases. This act follows a number of policy changes in North
Carolina designed to reduce regulatory pressures on industry, including those
focused on energy development (E&E Publishing, 2014; Kardish, 2014).
A few states have also demonstrated increased sensitivity to perceived inter-
state competition by pursuing dramatic severance tax rate reductions during
years of shale production. Oklahoma has long retained a statutory 7% tax on the
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gross value of oil and gas and has been one of the nation’s leading producers of
both energy sources. It has experimented with various tax incentives but moved
aggressively into the shale era with 2010 legislation that reduced the tax for hori-
zontal wells using fracking procedures to 1% for the first 48 months of operation.
This reduction was scheduled to phase out in 2015 but the legislature extended
it in 2014 with a slight structural change, increasing the lower rate to 2% and
only offering it for 36 months. This followed an extended period of debate in
the legislature over whether the reduction was overly generous in comparison to
other states amid support from select industry leaders for a restoration of the full
7% rate. In response, Republican Governor Mary Fallin heralded the 2014 agree-
ment as a step that would slightly modify the earlier rate reduction but serve to
“send a clear message to energy producers worldwide: Oklahoma is the place for
energy production and investment.”
Mississippi Republican Governor Phil Bryant echoed this sentiment in sup-
porting 2013 legislation to pursue a similar strategy to encourage horizontal dril-
ling and fracking. Under Mississippi’s “Energy Works” legislation, the established
6% statutory severance tax rate would drop to 1.3% for the first 30 months of
operation or until a well paid out. Industry estimates suggested that this reduc-
tion would save between $700,000 and $800,000 per well in the Tuscaloosa
Marine Shale. Bryant heralded this approach as part of a Mississippi “energy
road map” to make the state more competitive in attracting and expanding shale
oil and gas development.
Oklahoma and Mississippi were not the only states to alter tax rates in a man-
ner competitive with neighboring states. In the Idaho case, for example, their
severance tax, at 2.5% of market value, translates to a level that is several per-
centage points below the statutory rates of such established energy-development
neighbors as Wyoming and Utah. This new tax rate is the product of HB 379,
which combines Idaho’s two former severance taxes by amending the existing oil
and gas production tax of five mills per barrel of oil and per 50,000 cubic feet of
gas, and repealing the additional oil and gas production tax set at two percent of
market value. These two taxes were combined to update the tax language and
remove redundancies, while keeping the new rate consistent with prior rates and
low in comparison to other states, in anticipation of new production (Peiserich &
Christian, 2013; Smith, 2014).
Two states enacted a consequential increase in severance tax rate during the
past decade, but the 2007 Alaska Clear and Equitable Share (ACES) Act survived
no more than six years before a fundamental scaling back in 2013. Much of
Sarah Palin’s political rise was linked to proposed reforms of oil and gas regula-
tion following influence-peddling scandals involving legislators in the preceding
Frank Murkowski administration. Palin took a populist stance and proposed a
major increase in severance tax rates that were already the highest in the nation.
ACES established a 25% tax rate on the production value of oil and gas but also
featured rate increases for each dollar increase in the price of oil and gas above
$30 per barrel, a progressive sliding scale borrowed from Norway that
approached a maximum rate of 75% once oil prices surpassed $90 per barrel.
The state retained many incentives that served to reduce the effective rate,
including credits for energy company contributions to public education, higher
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education, and civic organizations. Nonetheless, this type of tax structure was
unprecedented for an American state and produced a huge and immediate infu-
sion of funding into the Alaska general fund after enactment (see Tables 2 and 3).
However, as the shale era began to unfold in the Lower 48, Palin’s former
lieutenant governor and successor, Governor Sean Parnell, agreed to a higher
base tax rate but a dramatic flattening of the rate structure along with extended
incentives to expand drilling and use public funds to support energy transmis-
sion, resulting in an overall lowered effective tax rate. This reflected growing
interest in Alaska in unconventional drilling as well as the views of some politi-
cal leaders and industry officials that the 2007 reforms would dramatically deter
further development. “Alaska can now compete with states like North Dakota
and Texas for investment capital and jobs,” announced Parnell in signing the
2013 More Alaska Production Act. “The Alaska Legislature has sent a strong
message to the world: Alaska is back, ready to compete, and ready to supply
energy to America” (Parnell, 2013). Not all Alaskans responded favorably to
this message, including Parnell’s gubernatorial predecessor. One vocal critic of
the 2013 legislation was Republican State Senator Bert Stedman who felt that
the changes reflected a “race to the basement” that could greatly impact Alas-
ka’s ability to sustain core services given its lack of an income or sales tax (For-
gey, 2013). This divide led to an August 2014 ballot proposition that, if
approved, would have restored Palin’s progressive rate structure from the 2007
legislation. However, the ballot proposition was narrowly rejected after a bitter
campaign that featured substantial energy industry financial support for the
opposition campaign. Shortly after this vote, Republican Parnell lost the
Alaskan governor race to Independent Bill Walker, who was endorsed by Palin
during his election.
In Arkansas, the state legislature held a special session in 2008 to address the
severance tax on natural gas extraction. While the bill passed during this session
increased the statutory severance tax rate from $0.003 per MCF to 5% of sale
price, it also created a reduced rate for shale wells, known as “high-cost” wells in
the Arkansas state code. This rate is 1.5% for the first three years of shale pro-
duction and is imposed to help offset development costs.
The generally cautious approach to state severance tax rates did not reduce
total state revenue from this tax, reflecting a massive increase in domestic oil and
gas production during the past decade. Many states continued to experience
steady revenue growth during this period, even though there was some slippage
in most states in fiscal year 2013 as gas and oil prices declined amid a surge in
production (see Table 3). Total revenues more than doubled during this period,
even when adjusted for inflation. North Dakota, for example, increased its sever-
ance tax yield from $138,244 in 2002 to $3,187,112 a decade later. Total sever-
ance tax revenue in the United States peaked at $18.2 billion in fiscal year 2012;
eight states secured at least 9% of their total revenue from severance taxes and
Texas came very close to this level in the following year (see Table 2). Whereas
many states likely thought that they were phasing out severance tax revenues
early in the last decade, the revenue outcomes were entirely different, raising the
question of how states would use this unanticipated bounty.
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Allocating Revenues in the Shale Era
States were more active in changing their allocations of severance tax revenues
than adjusting their tax rates. Between 2005 and 2014, 19 significant bills or con-
stitutional amendments on revenue use were adopted in eight states, with the
majority of these established since 2010 (see Table 1). To ensure that these reve-
nue allocations were significant, we narrowed our original review of legislation to
exclude legislation changes that reflected reallocation of revenues within existing
funds, as was the case with Idaho and Kansas. We also excluded cases where new
funds were created, but with the same intended goal as grants and loans author-
ized before the shale era, as was the case of Montana. Once we narrowed our
focus, we discovered that states have overall continued to place the clear majority
of their funds into the pot for general revenues. Indeed, the new severance tax
that Illinois adopted in 2013 follows this tradition by placing all new revenue
into the state general fund. In turn, we further found that the majority of states
with severance taxes have made no significant adjustments in their allocation for-
mula during the past decade (Brown, 2013; Pless, 2013).
However, review of these recent state changes on the whole suggests a grow-
ing attempt to break from traditional practice and instead allocate revenues in
one or more of three ways. In this section, we introduce these three options and
then explore them through the consideration of prominent state cases, particu-
larly focusing on North Dakota as it is the only state to move into all three areas
at the same time. First, some states have increased the amount of revenue desig-
nated to funds specified for purposes linked to negative externalities likely gener-
ated by expanded shale drilling operations. In some instances, this has involved
multiple bills or amendments that serve to earmark a portion of severance tax
dollars to specific environmental concerns with some connection to energy
extraction. These include targeted expenditures on water quality protection and
conservation, wildlife and habitat protection, support for alternative energy
development and energy conservation, and fire and emergency response
capacity, among other areas. States that have chosen to shift some portion of
their severance tax bounty in these directions include Colorado, North Dakota,
Louisiana, and Pennsylvania.
Second, some state reforms have increased allocations for local governments
likely impacted by shale development. General revenue funds, of course, can also
feature considerable reallocation to localities and some states have traditionally
allocated significant severance tax funds back to localities for core functions.
However, many state severance tax programs lack statutorily designated amounts
of funds that are intended for intergovernmental transfer. In some cases, these
are linked directly to the kinds of negative externalities noted in the above para-
graph, transferring funds to various municipalities, counties, and townships to
address infrastructure and other issues related to oil and gas development.
Indeed, the same states that have pursued some shift toward negative external-
ities have also pursued some form of specified intergovernmental revenue trans-
fer through recent legislation or constitutional changes.
Third, some states have revisited a method for protecting the long-term value
of their one-time bounty from the extraction of nonrenewable natural resources
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by creating trust funds. Such funds follow a pattern that became popular in a
small set of Western states in the mid-1970s but had otherwise not emerged in
the use of energy tax revenues until recent developments in North Dakota
(2010), Utah (2012), and West Virginia (2014). These trust funds involve some
formal allocation of revenue into a permanent fund that invests resources and
places tight constraints on expenditures.1 Part of the rationale for such trust
funds is to sustain long-lasting revenue from resource development to hedge
against the downside of subsequent boom-and-bust cycles and also allow time for
prudent consideration of alternative expenditures. Alaska is likely the state best
known for this approach through its Permanent Fund, which allocates funds
from interest on its substantial holdings in annual dividend checks to every resi-
dent of the state (Widerquist & Howard, 2012). However, allowance for this fund
comes from royalties from extensive drilling on state-held lands, whereas the
state’s severance tax revenues are poured exclusively into general funds that
cover the bulk of annual state expenditures. International parallels for this
approach include the Norwegian Government Pension Fund and the Alberta
Heritage Savings Trust Fund,2 both of which draw from oil and gas taxes and
royalties (Goldsmith, 2012).
Negative Externalities, Local Reallocation and Trust Funds: The Case of North Dakota—
Not long before the advent of shale development, North Dakota suffered the
embarrassment of being dropped from the Rand McNally atlas of American
states. This reflected a perception that its steady decline of population and
economic activity meant that it no longer merited inclusion of its own map.
But that tale seems hard to square with the past decade in North Dakota,
reflected in a surge of population and economic growth as well as the lowest
unemployment rate in the nation. Indeed, by 2012, North Dakota had four of
the American counties in the top ten nationally for per capita income, with
Williams County right behind New York City at the very top of the list
(Farmer, 2014).
This transition, however, has hardly been seamless and North Dakota has in
many respects become a national poster child for the challenges of confronting a
wide range of negative externalities across a vast landscape that appeared to be
emptying out just a decade ago. Expanded drilling operations impose substantial
direct impacts on roads and increase demand for fire protection and other emer-
gency services. In turn, counties with significant drilling also report major popu-
lation expansion and demographic changes that trigger steep increases in
demand for social services, with particularly severe issues related to expanded
crime and violence, drug and alcohol abuse, prostitution, housing shortages, and
rapid transmission of some communicable diseases (Christopherson & Rightor,
2014; Healy, 2013; Jacquet, 2014; Shafroth, 2014; Small et al., 2014). Major chal-
lenges for basic infrastructure include not only declining highway and bridge
quality but escalating rates of vehicular accidents, serious injury, and mortality.
Reliance on rail transportation has led to several disastrous accidents outside the
Bakken region, reflecting concerns about risks posed by the distinct chemical
composition of oil produced in the Bakken Shale that led to an extended state
review of safety practices in 2014.
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In all, North Dakota has become a focal point for a wide range of anthropolo-
gists, archeologists, sociologists, public health experts, and journalists, all compar-
ing North Dakota to other states and nations that have attempted to navigate a
massive, short-term expansion linked to development of a nonrenewable natural
resource while trying to avoid a “resource curse” experience. As agricultural
economist Nancy Hodur has noted, “The dynamic in North Dakota has changed
so dramatically and so quickly that the systems in place for addressing them
haven’t caught up” (Bolstad, 2014). These shifts are placing unprecedented bur-
dens on local governments in the Bakken region where energy production
occurs (Farmer, 2014; Raimi & Newell, 2014). Many of these governmental units
are quite small in terms of population and professional staff and thought until
recently that they were gradually winding down core functions due to steady
population decline in prior decades.
North Dakota suddenly finds itself awash in new financial resources that could
potentially mitigate these transitional challenges. The state has long maintained a
pair of overlapping severance taxes including both an oil and gas gross produc-
tion tax and an oil extraction tax that collectively set a higher tax rate on oil than
gas.3 There have been no changes in the rate of these taxes during the past dec-
ade but their revenue yield has grown exponentially over the past decade (see
Table 3). In recent years, they have generated more than half of the total state
government revenue each year.
But the combination of growing social strains and abundant revenue intake
has made Bismarck a place for near-constant debate over revenue use, which
peaks during biennial sessions of the state legislature. Three separate statutes
were enacted in 2013, collectively reallocating some portion of severance tax
funds either by creating new funds focused on such purposes as protection of
North Dakota’s “outdoor heritage,” including its water quality and natural
resources (HB 1278) and energy conservation (SB 2014) or to increase the share
of state revenue allocated to so-called “hub” cities that are facing the biggest
impacts of energy development (HB 1358). Reallocation of these revenues to
local governments, including these hub jurisdiction shifts, was the largest single
item in the 2013–15 biennium budget distribution of energy tax revenues after
designation of funds for the state’s new legacy fund that is discussed below.
Nonetheless, the political debate over the level of support states should provide
for strained local governments, particularly in cases that directly involve locally
experienced negative externalities from shale development, remains a dominant
topic in the state. Indeed, Republican Governor Jack Dalrymple rejected a pro-
posed special session of the legislature in 2014 that was sought by local govern-
ment leaders concentrated heavily in areas with significant shale development. But
Dalrymple did sign into law $1.1 billion in “surge funding,” a one-time infusion of
funding for infrastructure repair and development in oil-producing areas. This
legislation passed with overwhelming support from both parties in both legislative
chambers, although it was not designed to provide a long-term remedy. Pressure
also continued for additional ballot propositions to expand ongoing expenditure
for targeted purposes, such as a 2014 proposal to set aside 5% of all severance tax
revenues for the outdoor heritage fund, which was ultimately rejected by approxi-
mately 80% of North Dakotan voters.
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Despite increases in local government allocation of revenue, these revenues
have, in many ways, been insufficient to deal with local needs tied to the effects
of increased production (Raimi & Newell, 2014). Thus, the most consequential
alteration in North Dakota use of revenues from its oil and gas extraction was
not concentrated on immediate expenditures, but rather the creation of a mecha-
nism to protect some resources for longer-term use. The state’s referendum pro-
cess led to a 2010 constitutional amendment (Section 26, Article X) to create the
North Dakota Legacy Fund that sets aside 30% of annual severance tax revenues
into a designated fund overseen by the elected State Treasurer. For the 2013–15
biennium, $1.71 billion was transferred into the Legacy Fund, more than double
the funding allocation from the state’s severance taxes for any other specific pur-
pose. The accumulating revenues are invested in a combination of stocks and
bonds and no interest from the fund can be allocated for any purpose until
2017. Only earnings are available at that time unless there is a two-thirds vote by
the legislature to spend any principal, which is capped at 15% of the fund per
biennium.
The fund was established without any clear plan for expenditure, reflecting
instead a broad political desire to set aside substantial portions of revenue for
longer term needs, including those that might be tied to the impacts of shale
development or consequences of any future decline in production (Gold, 2012).
The extended delay until any expenditure would be permitted was designed to
allow considerable time to assess the nature of the transitions under way in North
Dakota and to consider options while also sustaining it for future use. “I’m a
firm believer that when you harvest a one-time, finite resource, you have to put
away some of that wealth for future generations,” noted Republican State Sena-
tor Dwight Cook. When considering how to use the fund, North Dakota officials
frequently note options including Alaska (which returns proceeds through divi-
dend checks) and Norway (which allocates revenues for pensions and social serv-
ices). The latter case emerges with particular frequency in North Dakota,
reflecting in part the state’s large Norwegian-American base in its population and
elected leadership.4 This includes Governor Dalrymple, who has noted ongoing
debates in Norway over allocation options. “If you have a state endowment fund,
how do you manage it?” he asked in a 2013 interview. “We’re not really far along
either. We’re really just beginning to talk about what we’re going to do with it”
(Fehr & Maynard, 2013).5
Targeting Externalities and Assisting Local Governments: Colorado, Pennsylvania,
Louisiana, North Carolina and Texas—North Dakota is not alone in attempting to
use severance tax revenues to respond to negative externalities and local govern-
ment needs linked to drilling operations in the shale era. In the case of Colo-
rado, severance tax revenues have long been split equally between a Local
Impact Fund and the State Trust Fund (Haggerty, 2012). In the former case, stat-
utory language requires that 70% of the revenue goes to local government grant
projects distributed by the Department of Local Affairs and the remaining 30% is
returned directly to local governments. The state has, however, halted grants in
some fiscal years to use funds to plug state deficits. In the latter case, the Trust
Fund is managed by the Colorado Department of Natural Resources, divided
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between a perpetual base account used to provide loans for state water projects
under the auspices of the state Water Conservation Board and an operational
account for DNR programs. Since 2010, eight separate bills have been enacted
that modify the distribution formula (see Table 1), including funding for various
water conservation initiatives, support for a new alternative energy fund, wildlife
protection, and also assistance for state programs linked to drilling such as the
Colorado Geological Survey and the Division of Reclamation, Mining, and Safety.
These represent an ongoing series of incremental changes that build on prior
efforts in Colorado to allocate considerable amounts of its severance tax funds to
specific environmental concerns with some link to energy development at the
local level.
Many of the severance tax bills introduced into the Pennsylvania legislature
before the 2012 adoption of Act 13 were designed to deposit most funds into
general revenues. That approach has resurfaced in subsequent proposals to
reconsider a severance tax option. Act 13 requires the vast majority of impact fee
revenues to be reallocated to local governments, with some linkage to negative
externalities related to drilling. Once localities approve collection of an impact
fee on drilling within their boundaries, the state collects that revenue and gives
the first cut to designated units of state government. Eight state agencies with
some role in environmental and public safety protection related to drilling
received approximately 10% of total funds during the first two years of impact
fee implementation, including units such as the Department of Environmental
Protection, the State Conservation Commission, and the Pennsylvania Emergency
Management Agency.
Sixty percent of the remaining funds are distributed directly to counties,
municipalities, and townships in proportion to the amount of shale drilling
operational within their borders. The remainder is placed in the Marcellus Leg-
acy Fund, which does not operate as a trust fund but rather manages competitive
grant programs. Under this model, local communities involved in shale develop-
ment compete for funds for purposes such as parks and recreation, bridge and
trail improvements, and other environmental projects. All of these provisions
were included in the 2012 legislation and have not been altered by the 2014
Supreme Court decision that overturned regulatory provisions that stripped local
government of many traditional powers over land-use controls. In 2014, the
Pennsylvania Auditor General released a report that alleged widespread short-
comings in the rigor of state regulatory oversight of shale development, noting
significant shortages of funding, staff, and information technology and advancing
29 reform recommendations (Department of the Auditor General, Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, 2014). State agency officials challenged these interpreta-
tions, though agreed with many of the recommendations. The future of
state-local governance on shale in Pennsylvania remained somewhat uncertain
after the court decision removed the tight restraints on local regulation (Rabe &
Borick, 2013).
Louisiana has also authorized some shift in its allocation of severance tax reve-
nue that is linked with more localized environmental concerns related to drilling,
with a particular focus on one highly sensitive ecological area. In this instance,
the state amended its constitution in 2009 with a ballot proposition that increased
406 Barry G. Rabe and Rachel L. Hampton
the amount of revenue remitted to parishes where production occurs and
required that half of the revenue and royalties produced within the Atchafalaya
Basin be deposited into a conservation fund to promote protection in the nation’s
largest wetland and swamp area. Seventy-five percent of the Atchafalaya Basin
Conservation Fund funding has been used specifically for water quality and man-
agement projects, while 25% has been used to complete ongoing projects as well
as projects in accordance with the mission statement of the Atchafalaya Basin
Master Plan.
North Carolina has also followed an approach that allocates severance tax rev-
enues to environmental purposes. The text of the Energy Modernization Act
states, “The purpose of the tax is to provide revenue to administer and enforce
the provisions of this Article, to administer the State’s natural gas and oil recla-
mation regulatory program, to meet the environmental and resource manage-
ment needs of this State, and to reclaim land affected by exploration for, drilling
for, and production of natural gas and oil.” In Texas, a ballot proposition called
for revenue allocations targeting infrastructure needs. Ballot Proposition 1 was
approved in November, 2014. This measure called for diverting half of oil and
gas tax revenue from Texas’ Rainy Day Fund to the State Highway Fund. These
revenues are to be specifically directed at the purpose of funding repairs, con-
struction, and maintenance of public roads.
Return of the Trust Fund—The idea of permanently setting aside some severance
tax revenues to assure ongoing investment of interest has precedent in other
areas of energy and natural resources policy in the United States (Patashnik,
2000). Several Western states established trust funds linked to a portion of sev-
erance taxes within a short period during the 1970s, although these were never
enlarged and the idea did not diffuse to other states through 2010. But the
expanded revenues made available via shale deposits may give the trust fund
idea connected to severance tax funds a second act, even emerging east of the
Mississippi River for the first time. West Virginia established a Future Fund in
2014, allocating 3% of annual severance tax revenues into the fund, although
earlier proposals specified a 25% transfer after collection of the first $175 mil-
lion each year. The fund is intended to generally address future expenditures
in the area of economic development, education, infrastructure, and tax relief,
but no immediate decisions were made on allocation plans from interest reve-
nues and no funds can be tapped until 2020 (Boettner et al., 2012; Osnos,
2014, pp. 48–49). In this case, West Virginia closely examined the North Dakota
experience and sent a delegation of 17 legislators from both parties to Bismarck
in 2013 to study the Legacy Fund model. “The concept of such a future fund
holds tremendous potential, as well as other successes that North Dakota has
experienced in managing their energy resources,” said West Virginia State Sen-
ate President Jeffrey Kessler. “I am very interested in what the state’s experi-
ence can teach us.”
Utah moved in a similar direction with a 2008 constitutional amendment,
which allowed the legislature to direct “money or other assets given to the fund
under any provision of law,” into the Utah Permanent State Trust Fund. The
permanent fund, which was created in 2001, originally collected revenues
Taxing Fracking 407
received solely from the tobacco settlement of 1998 and funds and assets
received by private donations. Because the 2008 constitutional amendment
allowed for new sources of revenue, the legislature could appropriate severance
tax revenue to be placed in the permanent fund each year. In 2012, however, a
new constitutional amendment found its way to the ballot once it became evi-
dent that little severance tax revenue was actually being transferred to the per-
manent fund as opposed to the general fund. This 2012 amendment was passed
and created constitutional language that required the placement of specific levels
of severance tax revenues into the permanent fund through a complex
formula.6
Conclusions
The first decade of extended development of oil and natural gas from shale
deposits presents an intriguing test of how states respond in an area of policy
where federal involvement is extremely limited. This raises many questions about
the design of regulatory provisions involving all environmental media through
an extraction process that is quite decentralized and involves tens of thousands
of separate drilling operations scattered across dozens of local jurisdictions in
individual states. It also raises the issue of how states approach the possibility of
taxing a nonrenewable resource that may frequently be processed and consumed
in another state or nation. This article reviews some of the lengthy history of
developing state energy severance taxes that are now applicable to shale gas and
oil. These have re-emerged in the shale era after an extended period in which
domestic oil and gas production, along with related tax revenues, were projected
to decline.
The shale rush has created a new energy reality in many states, posing a sig-
nificant set of economic development opportunities but also environmental chal-
lenges and potential strains for local governments experiencing a boom in
development while mindful of potential busts associated with mineral-intensive
economies. Our findings suggest that states have generally been cautious in
adjusting statutory tax rates to date, with little evidence of rate increases while a
few states have reduced rates in attempting to secure a competitive edge over
others and increase production. There is also evidence that some states are
beginning to explore ways in which they might allocate increasing portions of
severance tax revenues to respond to negative externalities linked to shale devel-
opment and protect funds for longer-term considerations that include any bust
in a post-shale period.
One emerging development toward the very end of our period of study in
this article reflects a plunge in global and domestic oil prices in late 2014 and
early 2015 and the possibility of major declines in natural gas prices. This raised
the specter of a reversal of the recent pattern of dramatic growth in severance
tax revenues, generating numerous questions about how this might influence
future tax policy and revenue allocation. In Texas, for example, state officials
announced in January 2015 that they projected a 14.3% drop in anticipated sev-
erance tax revenue from oil and an 8% decline in revenue from natural gas dur-
ing fiscal years 2016–17. Other states launched post-election legislative sessions
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with agendas that included possible revenue losses and the related question of
how to respond (Campoy, Peters, & Phillips, 2015).
It is far too soon to suggest that this could evolve into a “boom-and-bust” cycle
for which there is ample precedent in energy-intensive economies, particularly in
those states where severance tax revenues represent only a small fraction of total
state funds. But this rapid shift in pricing did underscore the potential vulner-
ability of recent forecasts that projected continuing revenue growth and posed
related questions for longer-term development of state severance taxes. These
issues emerged in a number of states after 2014 elections that generally
expanded Republicans control of executive and legislative branches in the major-
ity of states, although the only two Republican gubernatorial incumbents who
were defeated campaigned heavily on their efforts to either reduce severance
taxes (Parnell in Alaska) or prevent their creation (Corbett in Pennsylvania).
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Notes
1 Permanent funds are very different from rainy-day funds that do set aside revenue but can be
used in part or full at any time through legislative action.
2 The Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund was established in 1976 as a way to save nonrenewable
resource revenues (Pretes, 1988). Earnings, and in recent years, the fund’s net income, have been
used to support government programs. Handling of the savings trust fund has varied given oil
and gas revenues, with the Government of Alberta even terminating revenue flows to the fund in
1987. Although government contributions to the savings trust fund have since resumed, the net
value of the fund is considered comparatively low. In 2012, the fund was C$13.8 billion compared
to the C$15.5 billion in oil and gas royalties that were collected by Alberta in the year 2008 alone
(Plourde, 2012). Currently, despite oil and gas revenues, increased production and higher levels
of employment in Alberta, increased government spending has resulted in fiscal budget deficits,
with the Alberta Government using windfall from resource revenues to pay down the debt as
opposed to saving money in the savings fund.
3 The production tax is imposed in lieu of property taxes and is set at a rate of 5% of the gross
value of oil and four cents times the gas base rate; the extraction tax is set at a base rate of 6.5%
of the gross value at the well, but is reduced for new wells and other qualifying exemptions.
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4 More than one-fifth of the state population is of Norwegian ancestry and the overall population is
among the least diverse ethnically in the United States.
5 A recurrent theme in public debates in North Dakota over revenue use is avoiding major missteps.
As former state tourism director Jim Fuglie noted in July 2014: “We’ve been poor so long, then all
of a sudden, we won the goddamn lottery. You know what happens to lottery winners who aren’t
prepared to spend a lot of money. You read about them three years later. They’re in court, or
they’re in bankruptcy, or they’re divorced, or their kids committed murder or did drugs. That’s
the way we are.”
6 The official constitutional language for Utah’s allocation of severance tax funds into the perma-
nent state fund is: (9) Beginning July 1, 2016, the aggregate annual revenue from all severance
taxes, as those taxes are defined by statute, except revenue that by statute is used for purposes
related to any federally recognized Indian tribe, shall be deposited annually into the permanent
State trust fund under Article XXII, Section 4, as follows: (a) 25 percent of the first $50,000,000
of aggregate annual revenue; (b) 50 percent of the next $50,000,000 of aggregate annual revenue;
and (c) 75 percent of the aggregate annual revenue that exceeds $100,000,000.
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